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THE EVOLUTION OF CENTRAL SECURITIES DEPOSITARIES IN 
EUROPE: STABLE FUNCTIONS IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 
 
Gisèle CHANEL-REYNAUD 
Dominique CHABERT   
 
 
 
 
1 Settlement-delivery (S&D) operations of CSDs or ICSDs (1) are the second last stage of the 
securities treatment procedure, the last stage being the delivery of securities into the accounts 
of the final holders by their account managers/custodians (2). As for national transfers (3), the 
organisation is fairly simple since regional depositors are directly connected to the central 
securities depositary which fulfils two overriding functions on their behalf: 
- ensuring the final custody of securities and testifying to their authenticity ; 
- ensuring the circulation of securities within the market through one or several S&D 
systems (4). 
 
2 At national level, both these functions are most of the time performed safely, rapidly and at 
low cost, whereas cross-border operations entail much higher costs (5) and longer time lags. 
There are actually 33 different S&D systems in the European 25-country community (6). 
Other actors play a role in this already sophisticated structure, such as regional and global 
custodians, and ICSDs which act as depositaries for international securities. This 
“balkanization” is one of the obstacles to the implementation of financial integration, as 
pointed out in the two Giovannini reports (7). 
 
3 As a matter of fact, the unification of the financial market is being attempted by fostering 
competition between the actors, whereas the creation of the single currency implied a 
“federal” approach by setting up a single organisation to ensure a unified settlement system. 
This option has led a great many economists to liken S&D to the transport of goods and 
sources of energy (Knieps, 2004 ; Van Cayseele, 2005 ; Schmiedel, Schönenberger, 2005), 
and to advocate the free circulation of securities, while analysing the “natural monopoly” 
situation of the settlement systems. This situation, they say, is similar to that of the French 
Railways. There results an attempt at clearly separating the implementation and management 
of the networks (which might be seen as subject to the logic of natural monopoly) from the 
users of these networks (who depend on competition). We are in presence of an organisational 
and technological approach that places particular emphasis on the industrial character of 
finance. In this approach, financial intermediation is addressed through “transaction costs” 
rather than risk management, even if risk management is more consistent with the European 
functional approach. 
 
4 Although we consider this approach interesting, we will here endeavour to adopt another 
standpoint, focusing on the peculiar nature of financial commodities, and highlighting their 
kinship with money. We will resort to functional analysis to study the evolution of the 
different institutions, and compare how money and securities are respectively dealt with. We 
will eventually infer the changes in the central depositary function that are desirable. 
 
INCREASING SIMILARITIES BETWEEN CURRENCY 
AND SECURITIES 
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5 Until the 1980s, the distinction between the monetary and the financial, between currency 
and securities, was no big issue whatsoever. The two types of instruments were clearly 
distinguished both theoretically (duality theory, primary and secondary dichotomies) and 
empirically (completely different circulation networks, no return on currency, distinct 
maturities, perfect liquidity of currency vs. little liquid securities, high transaction costs for 
securities against nearly zero cost for currency, significant capital risk for securities, but not 
for currency). Financial reforms and above all technological progress over the past 30 years 
have made the distinction more and more difficult to pinpoint (8). It is one of the reasons why 
the central bank has given up its quantitative policy, and intervenes increasingly to ensure 
financial stability. In some markets (money markets), securities are perfect substitutes for 
currencies, and their S&D is almost instant (with RGV in particular). 
 
6 In the banking sector, the debts of banks now bear interest, even for individuals, their 
circulation generates transaction costs, and they can no longer be distinguished from the other 
debts to issuers, but for exchange at par with central bank currency. Here lies the main divide 
between securities and money, and here also lies the justification of a central bank for 
currency, and of a proven free banking system for securities. However, in the eyes of a 
custodian, this residual difference does not appear to justify such a divergence in the treatment 
of securities and money, if an increasingly effective substitution is believed to entail the same 
systemic risks. 
 
 
THE FUNCTION OF CENTRAL CUSTODIAN WITHIN  
A NATIONAL DOMESTIC AREA: 
A CRUCIAL FUNCTION 
 
 
7 The function of a custodian has evolved over time. More precisely, the importance of its 
two components has changed, with the progressive predominance of the circulation of 
securities over the function that uses trust as a tool. 
 
The stock-related function: trust as a tool 
 
8 From a functional standpoint, using trust as a tool has provided a basis to the very existence 
of depositaries. The founding myths of our civilisation show that deposits and depositaries are 
recurrent metaphors, and that using trust as a tool has been an integral part of the management 
function of deposits. Punishment (9), whether by Man or the Divinity, has always been a 
guarantee in case of breach. Trust alone justifies the attitude of the depositor, who ventures to 
allow his asset out of his sphere of influence – Parliamentary Report (1816). The function of 
using trust as a tool has been successively exercised by the Divinity, priests (temples), 
politicians (nationalisation of central banks, banks, central custodians) and, more and more, 
by independent (ECB), commercial or mutual (CSDs, ICSDs) bodies. 
 
9 However, repayment and the power of a depositary may vary depending on the asset being 
repaid its original amount, or if fungible, being repaid in the form of an equivalent repayment. 
This is what lies at the core of the difference between the treatment of securities and money. 
 
 
The function of the currency “depositary” 
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10 In the monetary sphere, deposits are fungible, a bank that issues commercial debts 
accepted as currency cannot only be considered a custodian, but also a debtor towards 
depositors with creditor status. In this sense, a bank can use the currency, but it has to repay 
an amount equal to the amount deposited, plus, possibly, interest. This situation has several 
consequences: 
 
“Intermediary currency custodians” (i.e. the banks that keep accounts) 
testify to ownership. 
 
 
- Banks issue debts that are used for transactions: commercial bank currency. So far in 
France, they have been the only bodies authorised to manage the circulation of 
currency. This situation is likely to change with the anticipated implementation of 
“payment institution” status, distinct from bank status. What we witness here is a 
situation of competition between the users of settlement procedures, as in the 
industrial sector. 
- Banks can “make the money paid into accounts by their clients work”. They are not 
obliged to separate  the amounts credited. 
- Depositors, for this reason, are faced with “information asymmetry” (10). Trust is 
therefore particularly important as far as money is concerned. In the banking sector, 
trust has become a reality through regulation, nationalisation, size, the diversification 
of balance sheets, or, more recently, effective risk management allowing to share and 
diversify the risks banks have to face. 
 
11 Moreover: 
- depositors enjoy a guarantee against the declining value of monetary debts of the bank 
through their exchange at the money with the currency issued by the central bank, 
within the same payment system (11); 
- depositors enjoy a guarantee against defaulting banks thanks to reserve funds ; 
- banks are subject to stringent regulation. 
 
                     The “central custodian” (ie. the central bank) matches stock to demand, and 
certifies the value of the currency 
 
- As a bank can lend the funds it manages on behalf of its depositors, it is not compelled 
to re-deposit all these funds with the central bank. Only a very small part is deposited 
as reserve requirements. 
- The role of a central bank is less stocking money than making sure that the amount of 
currency brought into circulation by the different actors corresponds to the needs of 
the economy. This justifies its leading role in the conduct of monetary policy, and in 
providing banks with liquidities (lender of last resort). 
- The value of a currency against other currencies is guaranteed by the rigour of a 
central bank in its management of the money stock. 
- A central bank has to authenticate the currency. Though this role looks more technical,  
it guarantees the real existence of a currency, so as to combat forgery. 
 
12  The function of financial assets depositary 
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Financial assets are not so fungible, since the holder, at any moment, stays the owner of a well 
identified security (eg. thanks to its ISIN) ; hence a needed separation between the securities 
held by a custodian on his own behalf, and those held on a client’s. 
 
 
Intermediary custodians testify to ownership 
 
An intermediary custodian is a market intermediary that keeps detailed computer track of its 
clients’ financial assets. Its custody is only intermediary. However, it proposes a whole range 
of strictly commercial services with much value added. It actually promotes a rather loss-
making activity, because of its high fixed costs, by proposing dataware housing services to his 
clients. 
- All outstanding securities are numbered in the holders’ accounts by account 
managers/custodians who act as  notaries testifying to ownership. 
- A custodian, whether intermediary or central, is not responsible for the value of 
securities, the fluctuations of which depend on market activity and the quality of the 
issuer. As a consequence, the holder fully accepts capital risk. 
- An intermediary custodian, which is CSD affiliate, can act as a link between the CSD 
and a foreign bank, a global custodian or an ICSD. In such a case, it will be termed a 
local custodian. For want of a direct economically justified link, foreign actors often 
have to turn to a local custodian, which provides information about local functional 
and legal practices. 
 
13                          A central custodian testifies to the authenticity of securities 
 
- Central custodians are not issuers; they just keep record of the securities issued in the 
country where they work. 
- A central custodian/depositary is the guarantor of the market’s trust in the existence of  
outstanding securities. It testifies to the authenticity of securities, and ensures their 
traceability, for want of which trading would not be possible. 
Knieps (2004) considers the two functions (authentication and certified ownership) to be  two 
elements of the notary function. This, we believe, is hardly acceptable insofar as both these 
functions are not performed by the same actor ; moreover, it assumes that the functions of 
intermediary and final custodians are subject to the same systemic risks, which is not the case. 
- Should an intermediary custodian fail, a certain number of people, and even 
institutions, would feel the pinch, just as they would if fuel deliveries came to a halt. 
Although the problem might prove preoccupying because of the importance of certain 
actors, this form of failure and mistrust stays at a local level 
- Should a final custodian fail, mistrust would encompass all securities in a given 
country, which would generate systemic risk. No one would be in a position to say if 
the securities do exist or not, if their stock tallies with what the final issuers have 
issued over time , if the corporate events have been insured. A process of general 
mistrust would thus be triggered, the consequences of which are more reminiscent of 
those of the BSE epidemic than those of power disruptions in California. 
The risk is big enough for this function to be regarded as a key factor in market reliability. “A 
central depositary is a prerequisite to any basic service provision by an efficient S&D system” 
(Karyotis, 2005). As a matter of fact, most countries do have a central custodian. 
 
 
14                              The function organising the circulation of securities 
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Over time, the function organising the circulation of securities has taken precedence over the 
notary function (12), in relation to the increasing number of transactions and the absence of 
recent scandals involving the circulation of forged securities. 
 
Changes resulting from  dematerialisation 
 
   The development of the circulation function : traceability. 
 
Dematerialisation has provided a custodian with new functions. Not only does it play a 
keeper’s role, but he also ensures authentication and traceability. In this respect, just as a 
central bank, as a currency authenticator, manages the circulation of bank money through its 
big-amount payment systems, so a custodian, as a security authenticator, manages the 
circulation of dematerialised securities through S&D systems (13). In a completely 
dematerialised environment, as in France, a custodian/stock manager has to “organise” stock 
inflows and outflows vis-à-vis intermediary custodians (possibly with the “CCPs” (14)). Since 
the introduction of the euro, the hallmarks of payment and S&D systems (15) have been 
closely linked, due to Lamfallussy rules (gross settlements for Target-linked, RTGS-affiliate 
S&D systems). 
 
 
15                                   The development of collateralisation services; 
liquidity inflow into the loan-borrowing market 
 
The centralisation of post-trade operations has gained particular significance as the actors in 
the same financial centre may be members of different clearing houses (this is not true of 
Euronext). Now, an actor’s default in a given market may propagate to other markets. In this 
case, a central depositary can curb the chain reaction by proposing the collateralisation of the 
traded securities (16). It thus enhances market safety and liquidity, trading and settlement 
systems efficiency by developing security loans and borrowings as well as collateralisation. In 
money markets, the bank-money circulation of securities via a central depositary is essential 
to the flexibility of the system and to the collateralisation of loans imposed by a central bank 
to intervene (17). Its role could be likened to that of a securities lender of last resort; however 
(and this is to be stressed), it does not issue the securities itself, but can only make them 
available at a bank’s request. 
 
 
16        The appearance of new actors due to the development of  trade at a world level 
 
ICSDs 
 
1 – They perform the function of central depositaries of international securities. 
    Historically, ICSDs perform the same functions as domestic depositaries, but they are 
mainly specialised in custody, clearing and the S&D of international securities.  
    It was Morgan Guaranty Trust of New York that set up Euroclear in Brussels in 1968. 120 
financial intermediaries gradually acquired shares of its capital (18). CEDEL (19) was created 
in 1970 by Morgan’s main competitors to counterbalance Euroclear’s monopoly. The 
development of euromarkets implied the creation of centres capable of clearing, S&D, and the 
custody of “Xenosecurities” (in particular eurobonds), which are, by definition, deprived of 
national identity. In this perspective, CEDEL/Clearstream (20) and Euroclear positioned 
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themselves successfully in the same market niche as CSDs. The acronym ICSD is thus 
perfectly justified as they are final central depositories of securities deprived of national 
identity. 
2 – They also propose related services. 
    ICSDs, however, do not limit themselves to this role. They intervene in transactions 
involving national securities when one of the contracting parties is non-resident. It means 
more complexity since ICSDs, in some countries, are not allowed to have direct relationships 
with CSDs (21). They do not necessarily have an account with each CSD, even though it is 
possible. This is why they have relationships with local correspondents (banks, local 
custodians), which have direct access to a CSD and its S&D systems. In Europe, securities are 
held in these banks on Euroclear, Clearstream or SEGA Intersettle’s behalf. Relationships 
between CSDs and ICSDs just intersect so long as the domestic and the national make one, 
but there emerge joint cost-cutting schemes, benefiting support functions, as soon as CSDs 
develop mutual links, or ICSDs “buy” local CSDs. Moreover, with the changing size of the 
domestic, the share of international trading keeps increasing. This is the way tasks must be 
performed by ICSDs: 
- in the case of a domestic security processed by domestic counterparties, and 
denominated in the local currency, the relationship is settled by a CSD; this kind of 
transaction will obviously grow scarce; 
- regarding a domestic security, the relationship is settled by an ICSD if either or both 
parties are not domestic; 
- if  the security has no national identity, the relationship is closed out by an ICSD, 
whatever the nationality of the investors. 
    If we consider circulation as such, the change from national to European leads logically to 
the replacement of CSDs with ICSDs. This statement must be qualified if we take the 
authentication of securities into account, as will be seen below. 
    ICSDs also propose a whole range of services with value added. In this case, they perform 
a function of intermediary, and not final, custodians, which partly overlaps the function of 
global custodians. 
 
 
17                                                          Global custodians 
 
    Intermediary custody has become a strategic means in the development of certain financial 
institutions at a world level. It is known as global custody when banks process the securities 
of many countries. A global custodian deals administratively with the securities under 
different national regulations. Most of the time, they sub-contract with local subcustodians 
(22). This results from the globalisation of investment, and the massive presence of Anglo-
Saxon investors in continental Europe, who want to diversify their portfolios and multiply 
cross-border operations. Custodians adopt a commercial approach to investors. They are 
service providers whose function encompasses other activities than strictly administrative and 
technical ones. Among these activities, let us mention: 
- information about portfolios (evaluation, reporting); 
- technical data about markets; 
- tax procedures; 
- management of loans/borrowings against securities; 
- management of demand deposit accounts backed by securities accounts; 
- risk analysis; 
- proxy voting. 
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    At a world level, the market for asset custody is highly consolidated and dominated by 
American banks (23), which pioneered custody as a profession worthy of the name. The 
charts here above show their respective market shares. 
    This activity, which heavily relies on capital investment in computer systems, aims to 
attract new institutional investors, credit or investment firms wishing to sub-contract their 
own custody business. Custodians constantly try to make economies of scale through mass 
processing, while keeping in a position to meet specific requests from their actual or potential 
clients. 
    All in all, when what is national and what is international can be clearly identified, the 
relationships between these different actors can be shown as follows. 
    In fact, this case is rather similar to that of correspondent bank accounts in an international 
payments context. What local custodians mean to securities is what correspondent banks 
mean to money. They have access to the S&D systems of CSDs ensuring the delivery and 
final custody of securities. They are the organic link banks have to create in the absence of a 
link with a foreign SSS (24). Due to the shortcomings of a non-system, specific functions are 
developed to be used as makeshifts. If we push the comparison with the payment systems a 
little further, the shift from the national to the domestic (in the European sense of the word) 
should obviously entail an institutional simplification for the operations performed within the 
domestic. This is why it is so important to give a proper definition of the domestic. 
 
 
THE MAKING OF EUROPE: 
THE SEPARATION BETWEEN THE NATIONAL AND THE DOMESTIC 
 
18  The making of a “domestic Europe of securities” raises many questions to the S&D 
custody business. On the face of it, a mere shift from a national domestic area to the European 
domestic one allows to envisage the existence of a single “European domestic CSD” all 
European intermediary custodians could have access to. It would administer a pan-European 
S&D system, and act as final custodian of “European” securities. Such an entity would raise 
thorny questions concerning the existence of national CSDs, the raison d’être of global 
custodians, which would lose some of their prerogatives, the positioning of ICSDs, and the 
status of a single domestic CSD. 
    What we mean by domestic area for securities has to be developed, regardless of  
institutional issues. Should this area be shaped up on the pattern of a homogenous regulatory 
area, or after the euro community area, or should it have the form of a “technological” unit 
that would fully integrate the securities processing line, following a deep remodelling of 
current legal mergers into technological mergers between the different market infrastructures? 
These three approaches could well coexist. They show how complex the current organisation 
is, with its converging regulations, its integration of markets and systems within a 
sophisticated, multi-levelled system (EEE (25), UE (26), MCE2, Eurosystème), its market 
consolidation of infrastructures (especially S&D) for activities the scope of which is 
increasingly global. 
    Analysing these issues implies a helpful study of the construction of monetary Europe to 
point out the similarities and differences, and highlight the specificities of the construction. 
 
19                                 As for the payment area, the domestic overlaps 
the euro zone 
 
A strong political will 
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Political will, in the field of monetary construction proved strong. The shift from a monetary 
community (the euro account community) to a community of payments worthy of the name 
involved significant means and efforts. Giving up monetary sovereignty and setting up a 
federal body (the ECB) do evidence this will. Yet, it did not prove strong enough to lead 
immediately to a fully integrated system. It brought about an ECB-monitored harmonisation 
of the national systems (via Target) for big amount payments. Small payments, for their part, 
were initially subject to the law of the market. Spontaneous adjustment did not occur, and 
payment infrastructures for small amounts remained scattered after the adoption of the euro 
(several clearing houses the balances of which were closed through the systems of the 
different national central banks). This situation called for the intervention of regulatory 
authorities. 
 
The role of the European commission  in regulatory matters 
 
Regulation indeed was what gave a strong push to the Europe of the systems of payments. A 
decisive incentive was provided to banks by the adoption of the European regulation which 
regards cross-border transfers within the EU as “domestic” transfers. Banks had to reconsider 
the processing procedures of transactions. The SEPA scheme, EPC’s achievements (28), pan-
European debit are integral parts of this approach aimed at strengthening payment 
infrastructures, and even creating pan-European structures (PEACH) to keep costs under 
control and streamline the processing of operations. If banks promptly reacted to the 
implementation of the SEPA scheme, it is because a European regulation expressed its refusal 
to pass the construction cost of the Europe of payments on to the consumer. It would have 
been politically infelicitous, in an enlarged euro-payment community, to overcharge small 
amount cross-border payments, even though it was technically feasible due to the presence of 
fragmented payment systems in a single monetary area.  
  
How a political will has imposed itself on financial institutions to build  up a genuine system     
 
Before the introduction of the euro, banks used correspondent accounts for payments  inside 
the European Union. Building up monetary Europe implied using the concept of a monetary 
union relying on a new unit of account. The ECB set up new infrastructures to transfer big 
amounts, thus helping the union to materialise into a large payment community. Target helped 
the shift from a non-system (no specific infrastructures) to a genuine system. It put an end to 
correspondent banking. 
    As for currency circulation at a world level, correspondent accounts have permitted 
international payments between different monetary areas. The birth of CLS in 2002 
accelerated the decline of correspondent banking to the benefit of this new multi-currency 
clearing infrastructure. 
    Two important remarks can be made. 
- Correspondent banking as a non-system is eclipsed by specific infrastructures. As 
soon as effective infrastructures are built (see CLS), correspondent accounts look 
historically dated (in particular “cash” correspondent accounts). 
- In Europe, the ECB as the legitimate authenticator of the euro stock has been placed, 
thanks to Target, at the core of this currency’s circulation. 
 
 
20                                             The construction of the securities area 
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A weaker political will has led to a stopgap solution 
 
There has been much less determination in making the Europe of securities. Currently, the 
difficulty stems from the multiplicity of the breakthroughs (converging regulations, mergers 
between Bourses, rapprochements between CCPs and CSDs) and their insufficient degree of 
attainment (regulations that lack unity, legal mergers without systemic integration etc. (29)). 
    The absence of a strong political will can be accounted for by other reasons than the 
fallacious impression that it is a strictly technical, and therefore boring, subject matter (30). 
Among these reasons: 
- no S&D systemic risk has emerged, making the implementation of a real pan-
European infrastructure even more urgent, as was the case with CLS (Herstatt risk) in 
foreign exchange markets (31); 
- the construction of the Europe of securities raised the question of who, at a European 
level, could have sufficient legitimacy to perform the authentication function, given 
the disappearance of the national dimension, and the non-existence, at the moment, of 
strictly European mutual institutions. The manager of a “securities Target” should be a 
sort of ECBS (European Central Banks System) for securities. This raises many 
questions. Who could manage the core of the system? Who could organise the 
circulation of securities in the absence of a legitimate authenticator? 
    For want of a satisfactory outcome, stopgap solutions have been adopted. CCBM has been 
implemented as an interim system facilitating the use of another country’s collateral securities 
in the case of repo operations with the ECB in order to have access to central bank currency. 
With the development of direct links between European CSDs aimed at facilitating the cross-
border circulation of the collateral, correspondent accounts should have been given up. The 
under-utilisation of these links explains the longevity of the CCBM, counter to all 
expectations, and its being still the most used system, whereas it is the very illustration of a 
non-system. 
 
21 The painful birth of regulation 
 
    A stalemated political Europe has caused the determination of public authorities to lose its 
edge. The idea of a European code of securities has long been considered premature, and the 
construction of the Europe of securities falls outside the scope of most citizens’ concerns. As 
in the case of small amount payments, one may wonder whether a regulation could be 
envisaged to speed up its implementation. 
    The Directive on markets and financial instruments (MIF Directive) adopted in the spring 
of 2004 chiefly bears on market functions through competition between traditional Bourses 
and electronic trading facilities (32), and through the internalisation of orders. By contrast, it 
deals with post-market functions in a succinct way. 
    The core of the current debate within Europe is the utility of a directive that would provide 
post-market functions, notably S&D, with an organising framework. The supporters of 
regulation (33) advocate the adoption of a directive aimed at separating the infrastructures 
from their users. The opponents (34) uphold the idea that it is the market itself that has to 
organise the future of the settlement and clearing business through competition between the 
actors concerned. At the moment, no decision has been made as to the relevance of the 
regulation. The  Commission has asked for an impact study, the conclusions of which should 
be known in early 2006. The Kauppi report (35) of July 2005 only reasserted the principle of 
the harmonisation of regulations at a European level (information on prices, free access, 
system safety). 
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    The Commission will have to answer the question about its obligation, or absence of 
obligation, to shape up S&D regulation in imitation of cross-border payments regulation. 
Supposing that it adopts such a rules, it will then be the job of operators to speed up the 
harmonisation process and the consolidation of the systems. In this perspective, they will be 
unable to pass the costs of cross-border processing on to investors in an area (the 25 EU 
countries) regarded as domestic (despite the diversity of the systems). This assumption 
implies that the Commission will also have to make a clear decision respecting the entity that 
will authenticate and manage the circulation of securities. If this proposal is repelled, the 
market will be the sole organising power, and will rely on industrial mergers. This is the way 
the Europe of securities is currently building itself up, in the absence of strong-willed 
regulation. 
 
 
22 The authentication problem is not resolved by partial regulatory frameworks based on 
industrial mergers. 
 
Cross-border operations involve a human factor which makes them less reliable (data-keying 
problems/operational risk), longer, and more expensive. For the time being, Straight Through 
Processing is unachievable internationally. As a consequence, it is extremely important, from 
an industrial standpoint, to standardise practices technically. This is what a certain number of 
firms that have merged have tried to do. All cross-border mergers, it must be noticed, have 
hinged on a single depositary having relationships with national depositaries. Clearly enough, 
the approach here is strictly industrial as in the case of mergers between traditional firms. 
    On the face of it, there is no reason why the industrial and the monetary (and therefore the 
political) should converge. From this perspective, there is a contradiction between the shaping 
of the European financial landscape into a homogenous integrated area and the restructuring 
of market conglomerates (macro-CCP, macro-CSD). 
    Infrastructures are taken into account and, from this standpoint, an integrated operation, in 
the technical sense of the word, and without reference to the European construction or the 
euro zone, becomes “domestic”. Certain integrated areas go beyond the limits of the monetary 
area, whereas fragmented areas still exist within the same monetary community. 
    Let us take three examples: 
- all Euronext securities markets belong in the euro zone. 
By contrast, such is not the case of the derivatives markets (Euronext-Liffe) or the post-
market business, with the LCH.Clearnet and Crest/Euroclear mergers. They are examples of 
technically integrated domestic areas that do not belong in the same monetary area; 
- similarly, the existence of LCH.Cleaner and the integration of CREST into Euroclear 
could be legitimately termed “domestic” operations, whereas the separate 
development of the securities business in France and Germany would rather be termed 
a cross-border operation  
- the same phenomenon can be observed in North European markets: in 2003, OM 
Group and HEX (Finland) merged Bourses that belonged in different monetary areas. 
OMX = OM + HEX + Vilnius + Tallin. 
They are mergers between euro zone countries (Finland), inside and outside MCE.  
However, it must be remembered, following Tapking (2005), the mergers so far have not 
resulted in a complete technological integration, even if the determination to achieve it is 
potent. For the time being, they are just legal mergers. 
Technological integration will indeed simplify the circulation of securities and reduce 
transaction costs.  
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However, the problem remains whole if the authentication function is taken as a standpoint. In 
this case, the legitimacy of the custodian (ICSD) as an authenticator is a reality only for the 
group members (Euronext for instance) with which it has entered into a cooperation contract. 
Vis-à-vis other actors, this legitimacy does not exist or can be questioned (as was the case for 
Clearstream). The custodian must then derive its legitimacy from one or several institutions. 
Obviously, such a situation cannot last. Now, the CESR makes no pretence of becoming a 
European regulatory authority soon. 
     In this article, we have chosen to leave the circulatory aspects of S&D partly aside in order 
to concentrate on the authentication and traceability functions of central depositaries, with a 
view to assessing the changes that have characterised these institutions. This has required a 
comparison with payment systems. 
    This approach has enabled us to point out that the similarities between securities circulation 
and currency circulation are very significant, and that the integration of payment systems, 
which is more advanced than that of S&D systems, might provide useful information about 
the changes to be desired in different institutions. Laying the emphasis on the authentication 
function, which is closely linked with systemic risk, has also enabled us to show that strictly 
“circulatory and industrial” approaches sideline questions we think essential to the 
construction of a European integrated securities market. 
 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1. The institutions ensuring custody will be termed as depositaries or custodians. 
“Depositary” must be taken in its generic sense, and not in the French sense of 
“dépositaire d’OPCVM”. 
2. This transaction is achieved by markets intermediaries with their secondary systems. 
They dish out the cash transfers and the securities received from the financial centre’s 
intermediaries among the final customers – buyers or sellers. 
3.  A distinction must be made between the national, which relates to a country as such, 
and the domestic, which relates to a given area. 
4. Euroclear France has two of them: RGV and Relit+. 
5. See AFTI survey, November 2002. 
6. See the Livre bleu, April 2004. 
7. Giovannini report 2001 and 2003. 
8. Circulation circuits are closely interwoven and present quasi similar hallmarks (gross 
or net systems). “Custody” time periods are nearly identical, due to the growing 
turnover of portfolios and the relative stability of near-money. The liquidity of 
securities has considerably increased, particularly through the presence of market-
makers, and the shortening of S&D time. Transaction costs for securities have 
considerably decreased, and tend to increase for currency. Capital risk for securities 
can be avoided thanks to the use of derivatives. 
9. Think of Pandora’s box and all the evils that followed its opening. 
10. The risk suffered by depositors has nevertheless been studied by Diamond and Dybvig 
through bank-panic models. 
11. See Chanel-Reynaud, Chabert « L’infrastructure européenne ; quels schémas de 
développement pour la future Europe des titres ? », La Revue Banque éditeur, third 
chapter. 
12. This is a very telling example of “blindness to impending disaster”, even if the 
suspicion Clearstream had to cope with for some time, or the markets’ sharp reactions 
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to the manipulation of information about Enron securities show that the scenario is not 
purely theoretical. 
13. AMF’s regulation: Central depositaries ensure the circulation of the financial 
instruments among their members, check that there is strict equality between the total 
number of the financial instruments issued and the number of the instruments in their 
members’ accounts, see to it that the working rules are complied with by the members, 
and inform the AMF about whatever breach of rules by one of the members. 
14. Central counterparties, if any. 
15. The French “règlement-livraison”, insofar as it refers to the simultaneity of cash 
payment and securities delivery. 
16. Humphrey D.B., Sato S., “Transforming payment systems” World Bank Discussion 
Papers, 1995. 
17. To bear this out, Perold (1998) indicates that securities deposited with a central final 
custodian, together with the creation of the Central Certificate Service, which 
succeeded the DTC, was a key factor in ending the US back-offices crisis in the late 
1960s. More than that, Perold holds that the absence of deposited securities sparked 
off Bombay’s stock market crisis in 1992. As a matter of fact, the crisis was caused by 
some operators’ utilization of significant time lags in the delivery procedure, due to 
the need to deliver the securities physically. 
18. Catherine Karyotis, 2005, « Mondialisation des marchés et circulation des titres », 
Revue Banque édition, p. 152. 
19. Securities delivery centre. 
20. The merger between the German DBC and Cedel resulted in the birth of Clearstream. 
21. Banks have long rejected this possibility as they often had stockholdings with the local 
CSD, and believed that trading in domestic securities was no ICSD’s job. 
22. They are local and even regional custodians (in the euro zone, for instance) when they 
only  manage the securities of an area. 
23. The major custodians in the world are State Street ($9100bn), Bank of NY ($8906bn), 
JP Morgan ($8014bn), Citigroup ($6640bn), BNP Paribas ($2958bn), Mellon Group 
($2946bn),UBS, Northern Trust, HSBC IFS and Sté Générale. Source: La Tribune 23 
November 2004. 
24. For Security Settlement System. 
25. European Economic Area. 
26. European Union. 
27. Single European Payment Area. 
28. European Payment Council. 
29. See Tapkings’s article(2005). 
30. This viewpoint is debatable and needs being debated, the more so since the adoption 
of the green book on the policy of financial services (2005-2010). The Europe of 
securities is made “tangible” by the ambition of a Europe of Savings capable of 
meeting the requirements generated by the new constraints relating to the funding of 
retirement pensions and the ageing of the population. 
31. It must be remembered that the implementation of CLS took place almost 30 years 
after the materialisation of Herstatt risk. 
32. Multi Trade Facilities. 
33. It is the stance taken by the Fédération bancaire française. 
34. See, for instance, the Villier report (2005) “Our focus should be on bringing down the 
cost of cross border clearing and settlement, which is usually higher than for domestic 
transactions. A directive is not the best way to do this.” 
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35. See the European Commission’s website www.europa.int (financial markets’ 
infrastructure). 
 
